Are We Heading Toward Socialized Medicine? by John Holahan & Stan Dorn
Amid a spirited campaign where health reform will be 
a leading issue, some have charged that proposals to 
restructure the nation’s health care system represent 
dangerous steps that would move the United States  
toward a government-run health care system and socialized 
medicine. Similar rhetoric was heard last fall when 
President Bush vetoed reauthorization legislation for the 
State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) that 
passed the House and Senate with bipartisan support. 
This paper examines that rhetoric and, in short, finds no 
evidence to support it.
Strictly speaking, socialized medicine involves government 
financing and direct provision of health care services, 
as with the traditional British system. Neither SCHIP 
reauthorization nor proposals from the major Democratic 
presidential candidates fit this description. While these 
policies would provide additional public resources to 
help the uninsured pay for coverage and would increase 
the pooling of risks in insurance markets, none would 
overturn the dominant role of private insurance and 
private providers in America’s health care system. However, 
some single-payer proposals (like former candidate Dennis 
Kucinich’s plan) would limit the ability of individuals to 
obtain, and providers to render, care outside the public 
system – potentially giving the federal government 
sufficient power to constitute the functional equivalent  
of socialized medicine. 
Some suggest that almost any expanded role for 
government in health care inevitably leads to strict limits 
on consumer choice, rationing, delays, and poor quality 
— all concerns traditionally associated with socialized 
medicine. These concerns, however, do not apply to the 
2007 SCHIP proposals or to plans advanced by leading 
Democratic candidates, which would offer workers more 
choices among competing, private health plans than they 
currently receive from their employers. 
Market-oriented approaches proposed by President Bush 
and some current and former Republican presidential 
candidates would expand coverage by granting tax 
subsidies that people could use to buy insurance in the 
individual market. But if tax subsidies are inadequate at low 
levels of income and there is little or no improvement in 
the nongroup market’s pooling of risk, many low-income 
households and people with health problems will face 
difficulties obtaining essential care – exactly the problems 
of poor access and quality that supposedly characterize 
public-sector coverage.
No reform proposal under serious consideration would 
result in either a purely government-run system or a free 
market that offers entirely unregulated and unsubsidized 
health care. All serious proposals are on a continuum 
between these extremes. For example, market-oriented 
plans retain significant public-sector responsibilities for 
Medicaid, Medicare, medical research, product safety, etc. 
Similarly, proposals to replace the current tax deductibility 
of employer coverage with refundable tax credits would 
redistribute a substantial amount of income from higher- 
to lower-income households – one of the major ways the 
government affects Americans’ lives.
The core issue in health reform is not specifically the role 
of government, but what policies yield the best possible 
consequences for the American public. Such results include 
the number of people with health coverage, individuals’ 
access to quality care, curbing cost growth, and consumers’ 
ability to make choices about their health care and health 
coverage. Inaccurate rhetoric about socialized medicine 
and government-run health care is a distraction from these 
much more fundamental concerns.
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Introduction
Last year, Bush administration officials 
claimed that congressional proposals to 
reauthorize the State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (SCHIP) could lead 
to an eventual government takeover 
of American health care. Before he 
vetoed the SCHIP legislation, President 
Bush characterized it as a “step toward 
the goal of government-run health 
care for every American.”1 Presidential 
candidates, including former Republican 
candidates Rudolph Giuliani and Mitt 
Romney, likewise labeled the health 
care plans from current and former 
Democratic presidential contenders as 
“socialized medicine.”2 Similar rhetoric 
was used to defeat national health care 
reform proposals in the 1990s3 and, 
with less success, to argue against the 
creation of Medicare in the 1960s.*4 
This paper examines these claims. We 
begin by exploring the meaning of 
such terms as “government-run health 
care”5 and “socialized medicine.” We then 
analyze SCHIP reauthorization legislation, 
broader national reform proposals 
from current and former Democratic 
presidential candidates (some of which 
resemble bipartisan reforms enacted 
in Massachusetts), and more market-
oriented reform approaches from the 
Bush administration and Republican 
presidential candidates, including 
some who are no longer running. We 
conclude that recent rhetoric is neither 
accurate nor helpful in clarifying the 
most important issues involved in health 
reform. The real question facing the 
public and policy-makers is determining 
not the health policy with the strongest 
or weakest role for government, but the 
policy that yields the best results for the 
American people in terms of coverage, 
quality, choice, and cost. 
*4 While we focus on the claims made by some conservatives, 
rhetoric on the other side can be equally inflammatory and 
exaggerated. For example, during the SCHIP debate, comments 
from Democratic lawmakers included, “How many children will 
be dead” if the president prevents SCHIP reauthorization, and “the 
Axis of Evil isn’t just in the Middle East, it’s just down here on 
Pennsylvania Avenue’’ (Jeff Emanuel, “The SCHIP Wars: Democrats 
Are Fighting Dirty, but Are Not Winning in the Process,” American 
Spectator, October 29, 2007).
Finally, this paper describes proposals 
from a number of current and former 
presidential candidates because they 
illustrate a range of policy options 
and arguments that frequently arise 
in discussing health care issues. The 
purpose of this analysis is to shed 
light on these recurring health reform 
concepts and their relationship to the 
government’s role in the health care 
system, not to explore the advantages 
or disadvantages of any particular 
candidate’s proposal. 
What Is “Government-Run 
Health Care” and  
“Socialized Medicine?”
To define these terms, this section 
divides health coverage systems into 
four categories, a modification of the 
approach used by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).6 The four 
categories move from greatest to least 
government involvement:
➤ “The public-integrated model 
combines on-budget financing of health-
care provision with hospital providers 
that are part of the government sector. 
These systems, which merge the 
insurance and provision functions, 
are organized and operated like any 
government department.” The best 
example of this model is probably the 
United Kingdom, though recent reforms 
have privatized part of the system. 
Outside the health care arena, another 
example of a purely public model for 
service delivery is the U.S. system of 
public K–12 education, in which state 
and local governments provide free 
education that is tax financed and 
delivered by public employees.
➤ “In the public-contract model, 
public payers contract with private 
health-care providers. The payers can be 
either a state agency or social security 
funds.” In many public-contract systems, 
the private hospitals and clinics are 
run on a for-profit or nonprofit basis. 
Independent private contractors 
generally supply ambulatory care. Most 
European countries, Canada, and the U.S. 
Medicare program belong to the public-
contract category. Some would regard 
these systems as comprising “socialized 
medicine” since the public sector 
organizes and finances much of the 
demand side of the market even though, 
by comparison to the first model, the 
government plays much less of a role  
in the actual provision of services.
➤  In the public-contract/private 
insurer model, public payers contract 
with private insurance companies to 
deliver care. This model—the only 
component of our classification system 
that is not directly borrowed from 
OECD—differs from the previous 
category in important ways. When 
programs like Medicare, Medicaid,  
and SCHIP deliver care through private 
insurers, decisions about covered 
services, provider networks, and 
provider reimbursement are made both 
by public payers and by the contracting 
private insurers. Private insurers bear 
some of the risk that public agencies 
assume in the public contracting model, 
and competition among insurers, not 
just providers, is possible. On the other 
hand, coverage in this category differs 
from the next model in that a public 
agency, not a private employer or 
individual, purchases the insurance. 
➤ “A private insurance/provider 
model uses private insurance combined 
with private (often for-profit) providers.” 
The private employer-based system in 
the United States falls in this category, as 
would most American reform proposals 
that rely on changes in tax incentives. 
Businesses and individuals contract 
directly with insurance plans, albeit 
with considerable government subsidies 
provided through the tax code.
The first OECD category of “publicly 
integrated” health care involves 
government-run systems that provide 
citizens with health care through public 
agencies, employees, or contractors, 
financed with taxpayer dollars. 
The deployment of those funds, the 
development of health care infrastructure, 
and the provision of health care services 
are all controlled by government policy. 
Only this model fully and unambiguously 
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meets the test of “socialized medicine,” 
where government, through publicly 
employed providers, actually furnishes 
health care, going well beyond financing 
and regulation.
Postwar Britain illustrates the broader 
context for this model. When the 
Labour government took control of 
coal mines, gas, electricity, rail, iron and 
steel, and the Bank of England, part of 
this systemic effort included creating 
the National Health Service (NHS).7  
The NHS classically financed and 
delivered care wholly through publicly 
owned hospitals and publicly employed 
physicians and other personnel. In 
recent years, British health care has 
become somewhat more privatized  
for some services.8 
Closer to home, another example  
of government-run health care is the 
Veterans Administration (VA), which 
provides subsidized care to veterans 
who qualify. Services are typically 
provided by physicians and nurses 
employed by the VA, in facilities 
owned and operated by the VA. The 
VA determines the scope of covered 
services, the health care information 
technology that providers use, and the 
access and quality standards that guide 
system management. Yet in some ways 
even the VA does not represent a pure 
government-run system. If necessary 
services, such as emergency care, are 
unavailable in the VA system, the VA will 
pay for services elsewhere.9 Moreover, 
the VA does not monopolize veterans’ 
health care; many eligible veterans can 
and do use other sources of coverage 
and care.
The VA is a highly unusual exception 
to America’s overall health care system, 
which relies heavily on private health 
care providers. Among U.S. hospitals, 
77 percent are privately owned and 
operated, and over 90 percent of 
physicians work in the private sector, 
usually in relatively small solo or group 
practices.10  Terminating the private 
character of health care providers 
and shifting to a publicly integrated, 
“government run” system of health care 
would represent a dramatic change. 
While only the first model involves 
true socialism, which has as its “main 
institutional cornerstone” the “social 
or state ownership of the means of 
production,”11 the second model 
can include such a strong role for 
government that the model becomes 
the functional equivalent of socialized 
medicine. If the government controls 
enough of the demand side of the 
market that providers have little or no 
choice but to operate within the public 
system, the government could exert 
such influence in terms of payment 
rates, covered services, quality of care 
standards, and the like that the system 
would essentially be government-run. 
That outcome would be reinforced 
by a dominant public-sector role in 
determining the nature of permitted 
capital investments in health care. This 
approach can certainly be defended 
as promoting equity and reducing 
the rate of growth in health care 
spending, but any objective observer 
would characterize such a system as 
government-run.
On the other hand, if the government 
buys care from providers on behalf of a 
significant but not dominant segment of 
the population, it would amass significant 
buying power and could thus reshape 
the health care system. The direct 
results of government purchasing are 
sometimes augmented by “ripple effects,” 
through which private insurers emulate 
public-sector practices. But so long as 
individuals and families retain meaningful 
access to private insurance and private-
sector providers have ample opportunity 
to market their services outside the 
public system, the second model cannot 
fairly be characterized as a socialized or 
government-controlled system. 
Some proposals that embody the 
public-contract model may leave 
room for ambiguity and debate in 
deciding whether the government’s 
role is so central that the health care 
system would no longer be pluralistic, 
with significant decision making 
responsibilities shared among a range 
of public and private actors. However, 
the proposals advanced in the SCHIP 
debate and the presidential campaign 
involve no such ambiguity, as is made 
clear below. 
The U.S. Health Care  
System Today
Our country’s health care system 
reflects a long history of multiple, 
incremental changes, in both the 
public and private sectors. The result 
is tremendous complexity. Different 
portions of the country’s health care 
system thus embody each of the four 
coverage models described above:
➤ Publicly integrated systems play 
a minor role in American health care, 
limited to the VA (described above), 
state- and county-run inpatient and 
residential programs treating mental 
illness and substance abuse, and a 
number of county-administered systems 
of indigent care.12 
➤ The public contract model is used 
with traditional, fee-for-service Medicare 
and Medicaid. This includes the majority 
of Medicare beneficiaries. In terms of 
Medicaid, this model includes a minority 
of beneficiaries but a majority of 
spending, since the elderly and disabled 
are disproportionately likely to be 
enrolled in fee-for-service coverage. This 
model also includes less than one in five 
children enrolled in SCHIP.13 
➤ The public contract/private insurer 
model applies to Medicare Advantage 
and Medicare Part D, both of which 
involve the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS) contracting 
with insurers to deliver Medicare 
benefits. It also applies to most of 
Medicaid for low-income families  
and most of SCHIP.
➤ The private insurer/private provider 
model predominates in American health 
care. It includes employer-sponsored 
insurance and nongroup plans, which 
together cover 68 percent of all the 
country’s residents.14 
From a different perspective, the 
government’s role in U.S. health care 
can be viewed in terms of demand 
(helping pay for coverage or care), 
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supply (helping finance the capacity 
to deliver health care services), and 
regulation. On the demand side, most 
health spending is private, but much 
spending is subsidized by government. 
Federal income-tax subsidies for the 
purchase of health coverage and health 
care, including the exclusion  
of employer health insurance payments 
from taxable income, are projected 
to reach $186 billion in FY 2008.15 
The employer exclusion helps finance 
health coverage received by 58 percent 
of all Americans and 61 percent of the 
nonelderly.16 
In terms of direct spending, federal 
subsidies for health care and coverage, 
provided through Medicare, Medicaid, 
and other programs, are projected 
to equal $829 billion in FY 2008.17 
Medicaid and Medicare cover 42.7 
million18 and 42.4 million people,19 
respectively, with some poor seniors 
and people with disabilities receiving 
coverage from both programs. The 
government also provides publicly 
funded health care to almost 9 million 
current and former federal employees 
and dependents through the Federal 
Employees Health Benefits Program; 
3.7 million veterans who receive 
health care through the VA;21 and the 
country’s active-duty soldiers and 
their dependents. Only 5 percent of 
the insured population in the United 
States does not receive some kind of 
government subsidy, either directly 
or through a tax benefit.22  These 
government expenditures involve 
sizeable transfers of income, generally 
from higher-income to lower-income 
individuals, particularly in the case of 
the general revenues used to finance 
Medicare and Medicaid. 
On the supply side, the government 
plays a major role supporting the 
nation’s health care infrastructure. 
Large numbers of hospitals and health 
systems are exempt from federal 
income taxes and, in most of the 
country, state and local income, sales, 
and property taxes; in exchange, they 
are expected to provide community 
benefits, such as indigent care. In 2001, 
the most recent year for which data 
are available, these entities controlled 
approximately $490 billion in assets 
and obtained over $500 billion in gross 
receipts,23 suggesting a substantial value 
to their tax subsidies. 
Outside the hospital system, 
government spending and tax subsidies 
finance the development of other 
aspects of the country’s health care 
supply. For example, 
➤ Federal resources support medical 
education and student loans, helping 
educate virtually every graduate of an 
American medical school, residency, or 
internship.24
➤ The National Institutes for Health 
(NIH) and other federal agencies 
finance a significant amount of basic 
scientific research that ultimately 
translates into new pharmaceuticals 
and medical technologies.25 NIH alone 
spends more than $28 billion a year to 
reach this goal.26
In addition to financing a significant 
portion of health care demand 
and subsidizing the development 
of health care supply, federal and 
state governments extensively 
regulate the provision of health care 
services by private entities. Those 
regulations include rules that bar 
employer-sponsored insurance from 
discriminating against older and 
chronically ill employees in providing 
benefits and charging individual 
premiums;27 that forbid insurers from 
denying coverage for maternity care 
based on hospital stays that exceed 
certain limits;28 that require insurers 
to meet solvency requirements, so 
consumers who pay premiums will 
receive promised services;29 that 
prohibit fraudulent and deceitful 
advertising by health care providers  
and health plans;30 that require 
physicians and other health care 
providers to be licensed; and that 
safeguard medical privacy.31
In short, government supports many 
aspects of the current health care 
system but with few exceptions 
does not “run” it. Nor would pending 
proposals change this basic structure; 
the exception would be some single-
payer systems in which individuals 
have little practical ability to purchase 
insurance outside of the government-
run insurance system and providers 
lack any significant residual private 
market. 
Pending Proposals  
for SCHIP and National 
Reforms 
This section examines two questions: 
whether proposals advanced in the 
context of SCHIP reauthorization 
and the contest for the Democratic 
presidential nomination are accurately 
described as leading to socialized 
medicine or government-run health 
care, and whether such proposals create 
the problems of choice and quality of 
care that are at the heart of concerns 
about socialized medicine. 
As a preliminary matter, by helping the 
uninsured purchase health insurance, 
each proposal would increase the 
amount of publicly funded health care 
subsidies. The same is true of more 
market-oriented proposals to expand 
coverage by giving the uninsured fully 
refundable federal income tax credits. 
However, such increases in the total 
amount of federal subsidies for health 
coverage do not seem to us to represent 
steps on a road to socialized medicine as 
long as the private sector continues to 
play a clearly dominant role in providing 
health care, as explained below.
SCHIP Reauthorization. In vetoing 
the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
Reauthorization Act (CHIPRA), President 
Bush argued that the legislation was “an 
incremental step” toward the “goal of 
government-run health care for every 
American.”32 Others likewise described 
the legislation as a “chip off the old, 
socialized-medicine block.”33 
The basic claim seems to be that 
CHIPRA would establish a beachhead of 
socialized medicine for children, which 
could eventually expand to engulf 
the country’s health care system as a 
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whole. That claim is inaccurate, since 
SCHIP provides most children with 
coverage through private health plans34 
and care from private physicians35 
(Figure 1). CHIPRA thus fits squarely 
within the “public contracting/private 
insurer” model that cannot reasonably 
be characterized as government-run or 
socialized medicine. 
SCHIP reauthorization would not 
create a dominant role for the federal 
government in the country’s overall 
health care system, or even children’s 
health care. Within SCHIP, decision-
making authority is shared between 
the federal government, states (which 
possess considerable flexibility in 
structuring benefits, cost-sharing, 
health care delivery, eligibility rules, 
etc.), and private insurers. Moreover, 
CHIPRA would result in a total SCHIP 
enrollment of 7.4 million children in 
2012, according to the Congressional 
Budget Office,36 or less than one in 10 
children.37 The vast majority of pediatric 
coverage and care would remain private.
Health Insurance Exchange 
Proposals. Along similar lines, health 
reform proposals from most Democratic 
presidential candidates resemble the 
policy enacted in Massachusetts as 
a bipartisan compromise between a 
largely Democratic legislature and a 
Republican governor. Embodied in 
various forms within proposals made by 
current and former candidates Clinton, 
Edwards, Obama, and Richardson, this 
health reform strategy has the following 
key elements: 
➤ A new option—but not a 
requirement—for consumers and 
employers to obtain coverage through 
a health insurance exchange offering 
competing private plans that include 
some diversity in out-of-pocket cost-
sharing, covered benefits, provider 
networks, and access to out-of-network 
services. Most individuals who select 
coverage that is more costly would pay 
some or all of the resulting increase 
in premiums. The proposals forbid 
or limit variation of premiums and 
covered services based on individual 
characteristics like health status, age, 
gender, etc. Proposals differ in terms 
of precisely which consumers and 
employers may use this option and 
whether a public-sector plan competes 
for business with purely private plans. 
➤ In many (but not all) proposals,  
a requirement for some or all residents 
to purchase insurance. 
➤ A requirement for some or 
all employers to help fund health 
coverage, by either paying a tax or 
contributing to the cost of their 
employees’ coverage. Proposals vary in 
terms of the size of company to which 
this requirement applies and the level 
of contribution required from each 
employer.
➤ Subsidies to help low-income 
consumers obtain coverage, through 
either Medicaid, SCHIP, or the health 
insurance exchange or purchasing pool. 
How these subsidies are financed varies 
considerably.
These proposals would keep the 
country’s health care system anchored 
predominantly within the current 
private insurance/private provider 
model, although the government would 
play an enhanced role in organizing the 
market and provide additional financing. 
However, the proposals that allow 
public-sector plans to compete with 
private coverage would incorporate 
elements of the intermediate “public 
contract” model, through which a 
government agency contracts directly 
with private providers. None of these 
proposals would shift the country into 
“government-run health care,” or the 
“public integrated model,” in OECD 
parlance. In fact, they would all increase 
the amount of coverage provided by 
private insurers.
“Medicare for All” Proposals. 
Qualitatively different proposals 
have been advanced by former 
presidential candidate Dennis Kucinich 
and a number of federal legislators, 
including Senator Kennedy (D-MA) and 
Representatives Stark (D-CA), Dingell 
(D-MI), and Conyers (D-MI). These 
“Medicare for all” or “single-payer” 
proposals would expand Medicare by 
covering nonelderly Americans and 
adding benefits. Most proposals would 
fund coverage through an increased 
payroll tax. Some of these proposals 
would permit employers to opt out of 
the new “Medicare for all” plan. Some 
would allow individuals to keep private 
insurance but opt into Medicare for all 
if they deemed themselves better off 
under the latter arrangement.
Even this more expansive approach to 
reform would not interfere with the 
largely private character of the country’s 
health care providers. Accordingly, 
“Medicare for all” proposals would 
not involve “government-run health 
care” along the lines of the “public 
integrated model” described by OECD. 
President’s Proposal*
70%
Private managed care plans
16%
Fee-for-service care
14%
Primary care case 
management
SCHIP
Figure 1. Children Enrolled in SCHIP, by Type of Health Coverage: 2005
Source: McInerney 2007.
Note: Primary care case management systems assign children to primary care providers, who serve as gatekeepers 
managing their overall care. 
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Such proposals would, however, shift 
the country’s basic coverage system 
into a “public contract” model like that 
used in Canada, a number of European 
countries, and the current Medicare 
program in the United States. 
Some single-payer proposals would 
go much further; an example is that 
advanced by Congressman Kucinich 
(HR 676). A new federal program would 
be the exclusive source of coverage 
for a broad range of services, including 
primary care and prevention, inpatient 
care, outpatient care, emergency care, 
prescription drugs, durable medical 
equipment, long-term care, mental 
health services, dental services (other 
than cosmetic dentistry), substance 
abuse treatment, chiropractic care, 
basic vision care, and hearing services. 
Private insurance would be forbidden 
from offering services in the areas 
covered by the national plan. For-profit 
medical care would be forbidden, 
and profit-making health care entities 
would be required to convert to 
charitable organizations. Government 
authorities would make decisions 
about capital investment in health 
care infrastructure, promulgate quality 
standards, define a national formulary 
for prescription medication, and 
set reimbursement levels. Providers 
accepting reimbursement from the 
public program could not accept 
any payments from patients. Put 
simply, individuals would have little 
or no choice over their insurance 
arrangements and providers would 
have very few options to provide care 
outside of the government-financed 
system. While health care providers 
would nominally remain private, the 
government’s authority would be 
so all-encompassing that the system 
would be the functional equivalent of 
socialized medicine. 
Choice, Access, and  
Quality of Care 
While we regard as overstated the 
claim that any but the final proposal 
described above moves towards 
“socialized medicine,” many think 
otherwise and have real fears and 
concerns involving consumer choice 
and quality of care. Several fundamental 
fears are at the heart of the opposition 
to an increased government role in 
the country’s health care system. First, 
some believe that a strengthened public 
sector could take health care choices 
away from consumers. In the words of 
a recent Cato Institute report, “a patient 
should always be able to spend his 
own money on the health care services 
he desires. Yet that freedom is often 
threatened or denied when government 
tries to provide universal health 
insurance coverage…”38 Second, some 
believe that public-sector involvement 
in health care inevitably dilutes 
health care quality. As President Bush 
explained to justify his veto of SCHIP 
legislation, “government-run health 
care” leads to “rationing, inefficiency, 
and long waiting lines.”39 
In analyzing the merits of particular 
proposals, these underlying concerns 
about choice and quality can and should 
be evaluated on their own terms, as we 
do in the following sections. 
Pending Proposals and Consumer 
Choice. In this section, we argue the 
following: 
➤ SCHIP reauthorization proposals 
would expand consumer choice;
➤ National health reforms built 
around health insurance exchanges 
would expand choices for most 
consumers, though some would lose 
the option to remain uninsured, if 
the proposal contains an individual 
mandate, as many do;
➤ Proposals to enroll all Americans in 
an expanded Medicare program would 
offer significant consumer choice of 
health care providers and, in some 
versions, choice among health plans, 
though the option to retain current 
coverage would be foreclosed; and
➤ All of these proposals would 
significantly expand health care choices 
for uninsured consumers who gain 
health coverage.
As a starting point for this analysis, 
consumer choice is far from unlimited 
today. Just 49 percent of American 
workers have employers who offer 
health coverage with a choice of more 
than one plan.40 Low-income workers 
are even less likely to have health 
coverage options at work; in firms 
offering coverage, the percentage of 
employees with a choice of more than 
one plan falls from 59 percent among 
those earning more than $60,000 to  
37 percent for workers earning less 
than $20,000.41 
By contrast, with SCHIP, most low-
income families are offered multiple 
choices from competing private 
plans.42 Within each state, all SCHIP 
plans offer a uniform set of benefits. 
Nevertheless, enrollees can “vote with 
their feet” if they are unhappy with 
their insurer—a choice not available 
to most low-income recipients of 
employer-based coverage. CHIPRA 
would further expand those options. 
It would increase states’ capacity 
to offer families the choice of using 
SCHIP subsidies to enroll in employer-
sponsored family coverage rather than 
state-contracting, private plans serving 
children only.
Going farther along these general 
lines, proposals to establish health 
insurance exchanges offering diverse, 
competing health plans represent a 
significant expansion of consumers’ 
health plan choices. In the context of 
the Massachusetts health insurance 
exchange, Heritage Foundation analysts 
agree that this policy mechanism 
represents an “approach to making 
consumer choice and ownership of 
health insurance the fundamental 
organizing principle of a state’s health 
system.”43 The same basic mechanism 
would give millions of American 
consumers a broad range of private 
health insurance choices under pending 
national policy proposals. 
On the other hand, many Massachusetts-
type proposals require some or all 
consumers to purchase coverage. 
Likewise, some or all employers would 
be required to make contributions 
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to cover health care costs. These 
mandates would not affect the 
majority of individuals or firms, since 
most individuals receive coverage 
today44 and most companies offer it 
(particularly among firms with 25 or 
more workers).45 However, uninsured 
individuals and companies that do not 
cover their workers today could be 
compelled to make significant new 
payments to the government, depending 
on the proposal’s details. In sum, this set 
of proposals expands health coverage 
options for most consumers but takes 
away the choice to remain uninsured 
and removes from employers the option 
to contribute nothing to their workers’ 
health insurance costs. 
“Medicare for all” proposals retain 
consumer choice at several levels. First, if 
Medicare keeps its current configuration 
(as described above), consumers can 
choose between private managed care 
plans and “traditional Medicare,” through 
which the federal government directly 
pays health care providers. Second, the 
traditional Medicare program offers a 
substantial choice of providers, greater 
than that offered by many (but not all) 
private health plans. For example, 98 
and 97 percent of physicians accept 
new patients covered by Medicare and 
non-HMO private insurance, respectively, 
compared with 86 percent who accept 
new patients covered by private 
HMOs.46
In some ways, this choice among health 
care providers may be more important 
than a choice among health insurance 
plans, since consumer satisfaction 
with health care is much more highly 
correlated with the former than the 
latter.47 On the other hand, under 
“Medicare for all” proposals, most 
consumers would be unable to retain 
their current health plan. This loss 
of choice could be important. More 
than half of Americans with health 
coverage (55 percent) report that they 
are extremely satisfied or very satisfied 
with their current health plan.48 Of 
course, the version of single-payer 
health care espoused by some (e.g., 
Congressman Kucinich) would more 
fundamentally limit consumer choice 
by forbidding the private purchase of 
most health insurance.
Finally, all of these policy proposals 
would significantly expand health 
Figure 2. Consumer Satisfaction Ratings, by Source of Coverage, 
Adults Age 50–70: 2004
Source: Commonwealth Fund Survey of Older Adults, 2004.
Figure 3. Percentage Reporting Various Problems with Care, Medicare 
Enrollees vs. Privately Insured Adults Age 55–64: 2003
Source: Trude and Ginsburg 2005.
Figure 4. Average Number of Days Waiting for Various Types of Care, 
Medicare Enrollees vs. Privately Insured Adults Age 55–64: 2003
Source: Trude and Ginsburg 2005.
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care choices for the uninsured by 
providing them with health coverage. 
The uninsured frequently are unable to 
access needed care because of cost,49 
and they have many fewer choices of 
health care providers than are available 
to people with any type of insurance 
coverage.50
Pending Proposals and Quality 
and Access. The kind of health care 
access and quality problems that 
the president described as typifying 
publicly run health care do not apply 
to SCHIP or the main national health 
reforms proposed in the presidential 
race. When children enroll in SCHIP, 
numerous studies document significant 
improvements in access to care, 
relative to being uninsured.51 Despite 
low reimbursement rates that limit 
provider participation and access to 
care, much research suggests that 
access to primary care for children 
in public programs like SCHIP and 
Medicaid is generally comparable to 
or, in some cases, better than that in 
privately funded insurance.52 One 
possible explanation is that, typically, 
benefits are more generous and out-of-
pocket costs are more limited in public 
programs serving low-income children 
than with private insurance developed 
to meet the needs of adult workers. The 
exception may be access to specialty 
care and the latest technologies, 
which may be more affected by low 
reimbursement rates.53 
Moreover, observers who believe 
that quality of care and access 
are inherently better with private 
insurance than publicly provided 
health care need to recognize that 
private managed-care plans deliver 
most SCHIP services and have financial 
incentives to provide high-quality care, 
both to maintain their contracts with 
state health agencies and to attract 
enrollees. Such market mechanisms 
for improving quality are even more 
powerful in the case of reforms based 
on health insurance exchanges, which 
are structured to facilitate competition 
among insurers based on quality, 
among other factors.54 
In terms of Medicare, consumer 
satisfaction ratings generally exceed 
those for privately insured older adults 
(Figure 2).55 Average waiting times to 
see physicians are now comparable for 
Medicare beneficiaries and the privately 
insured near-elderly, with Medicare 
beneficiaries less likely to report delays 
or denials of necessary care (Figures 3 
and 4).56
Three final comments on this issue are 
important. First, as the above charts 
suggest, much evidence casts doubt 
on the belief that public involvement 
in health care inevitably worsens the 
quality of care and access to necessary 
services. In fact, the VA, one of the 
country’s only health care systems that is 
entirely publicly administered, has been 
a pioneer in the use of electronic health 
records and the successful management 
of chronic conditions, outperforming 
most private coverage on a range of key 
quality indicators.57 Moreover, although 
the American health care system 
provides insured residents with excellent 
access to the latest medical technology 
and is capable of rapid change to address 
consumers’ changing preferences,58 
other countries with stronger public-
sector roles outperform the United 
States on numerous quality measures, 
including waiting times for doctor visits 
to treat medical problems. On the other 
hand, Americans are more likely than 
the residents of many other developed 
countries to receive preventive care, to 
receive recommended care for certain 
chronic conditions, and to have only 
short waits for diagnostic tests, specialty 
care, and elective surgery.59 
Second, quality and access problems 
encountered by publicly funded 
programs have resulted primarily from 
limits on financial support reflected in 
low reimbursement rates for Medicaid 
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, 
SCHIP.  This is a function of funding 
levels, not public-sector involvement, 
however, and reflect the unwillingness 
of state legislatures to commit the 
resources necessary to adequately pay 
physicians and hospitals. Even though 
it is a public program, Medicare has 
secured better access to care than that 
provided by private coverage,60 thanks 
to reimbursement rates substantially 
more generous than Medicaid’s. This 
difference in financial support and 
access to care between Medicare and 
Medicaid may ultimately result from two 
factors: the federal government runs 
the former and states essentially run the 
latter; and Medicare’s constituency is a 
broader segment of the population in 
terms of income distribution.
Third, concerns over choice, quality, and 
access are fair to raise with proposals 
in which the government is the sole 
buyer of an overwhelming share of the 
country’s health care services, leaving 
neither individuals nor providers 
much real choice beyond participating 
in the government-financed system. 
Such proposals achieve equity, since 
everyone has the same coverage, and 
they offer the ability to control the 
rate of growth in expenditure. But 
this ability to control spending can 
also have adverse effects on quality 
and access. It can lead to provider 
dissatisfaction, which could readily 
translate into consumer dissatisfaction. 
With centralized rather than dispersed 
responsibility over health care policy, 
mistaken decisions can have much more 
significant unforeseen consequences. 
These results are a function of the 
extent of government control, the lack 
of realistic alternative options, and 
budget pressures. They are unlikely 
to materialize if the government-
administered health plan operates 
as one of many competing choices 
offered to consumers, permitting 
providers to furnish care in public 
and private insurance systems. Such 
a pluralistic approach, with widely 
dispersed responsibility for health care 
decisions and a significant role for 
consumer choice and market pressures, 
is essentially the model that leading 
Democratic contenders have espoused. 
Market-Oriented Proposals
Other proposals pursue a more market-
based approach, giving people tax 
subsidies they can use to purchase 
coverage in the individual market. 
These approaches seek to provide a 
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range of health coverage choices, using 
market forces rather than government 
regulations to provide the kind of care 
that consumers want, at an affordable 
price. In this section, we argue the 
following: 
➤ Proponents of these market-
oriented proposals agree that a strong 
public-sector role is appropriate if it 
accomplishes important objectives. 
That is why these proposals retain most 
functions served by government today 
and, in some cases, embrace aggressive 
new government interventions. 
➤ Many market-oriented proposals 
would create problems of quality and 
access to care for some people— 
the very problems some argue are 
characteristic of publicly run systems. 
The Bush administration and current 
and former Republican candidates 
for president have proposed several 
significant changes in tax policy 
intended to expand coverage while 
achieving other policy goals. These 
changes have included refundable, 
advanceable tax credits for low-
income, uninsured workers that were 
proposed during the president’s first 
term and that Governor Huckabee 
and Senator McCain support;61 
several rounds of tax subsidies 
for high-deductible coverage and 
Health Savings Accounts (HSAs); 
and proposals from both the Bush 
administration, Senator McCain, 
and Mayor Giuliani to replace the 
current tax exclusion of employer-
sponsored insurance with either 
a fixed deduction or a refundable, 
advanceable tax credit for health 
coverage obtained from employers  
or the individual market.
While many of these proposals have 
been couched in terms of increasing 
the role played by market mechanisms 
and consumer choice, none would 
make substantial reductions62 to 
the government’s current role in 
the country’s health care system. As 
explained above, this role involves 
supporting health care demand by 
subsidizing the purchase of health 
care and health coverage; supporting 
health care supply by financing 
the development of health services 
and health care infrastructure; and 
regulating the services and coverage 
that may be bought and sold. The Bush 
administration would also maintain 
(and has expanded funding for) an 
extensive system of community health 
centers, a delivery system with a 
major government role in financing, 
administration, and regulation. 
Nonetheless, proposals from the 
Bush administration and market-
oriented presidential candidates are 
fundamentally different than the 
approaches described in the previous 
section of this paper. Rather than 
having the government contract with 
diverse plans and letting individuals 
choose among them, many of these 
proposals would give people additional 
resources through tax deductions or 
tax credits and allow them to purchase 
coverage “that best suits their needs” 
in a relatively unfettered individual 
insurance market. 
The tax proposals that have granted 
tax-preferred status to high-deductible 
health plans and HSAs have the intent 
of shifting much health care spending 
out of third-party payment and into 
direct agreements between consumers 
and health care providers, with the 
goals of increasing market competition 
among providers and restraining health 
care spending. These tax changes were 
introduced to counter the incentive 
inherent in the employer exclusion as 
currently structured, which favors the 
purchase of comprehensive coverage. 
The objective was to get individuals to 
choose less comprehensive coverage 
and thus reduce the incentives to 
overuse health services, thereby 
lowering health care spending and 
making coverage more affordable. 
Also using federal tax policy to 
galvanize significant changes in the 
country’s health care system, proposals 
by the Bush administration and 
Mayor Giuliani would shift millions of 
Americans from employer-sponsored 
insurance to the individual market. 
This would be done by replacing the 
current open-ended tax exclusion 
of employer coverage with either 
a fixed standard deduction or a 
refundable tax credit usable in the 
individual or employer market. The 
current exclusion is highly regressive 
with greater tax benefits at the high 
end of the income distribution than 
at the lower end.63 A fixed standard 
deduction is also regressive. While 
increasing incentives to economize 
on health care, it would benefit those 
in the highest tax brackets and do 
little to help those in lower income 
tax brackets to purchase coverage. 
But the Bush administration has more 
recently made it clear that it will 
also support the replacement of the 
tax deduction with a refundable tax 
credit.64 A fixed dollar, fully refundable 
income tax credit would be equally 
valuable to all individuals. This could 
result in more people being willing 
to take up coverage relative to the 
standard deduction. But it would 
also mean, depending on the credit’s 
generosity, that substantial amounts 
of income would shift from higher-
income to lower-income households. 
While market oriented, the proposal 
thus retains a key role for government 
redistributing income via the tax code. 
Such tax proposals could have other 
consequences as well, largely because 
of their effects on the pooling of 
risk. Letting people use their own 
money coupled with tax subsidies to 
purchase coverage in the individual 
market would likely lead to a greater 
range of benefit package offerings. This 
would likely increase the amount of 
risk segmentation. That is, those who 
do not want a particular benefit (e.g., 
prescription drugs) can choose a plan 
without it. But healthy people would 
be more likely to choose such a plan, 
not those with chronic illnesses. There 
would be less pooling of risk—that 
is, people would self-insure for the 
benefits that are not covered. The same 
argument applies to the elimination 
of mandated benefits; there would 
be no pooling of risk for benefits 
that disappear from coverage when 
mandates are repealed. 
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There is also generally little insurance 
regulation proposed in these types 
of market proposals. In fact, the Bush 
administration and current and former 
Republican candidates Giuliani and 
McCain propose to let individuals buy 
individual insurance sold across state 
lines, thereby undermining strong 
regulatory regimes that exist in a 
minority of states. A largely unregulated 
individual market can make it difficult 
for individuals with health conditions 
to obtain coverage or let them obtain it 
only at a very high premium. It would 
allow those in relatively good health to 
find plans that are much less expensive. 
This occurs not because of increased 
efficiency but because there is less 
pooling of risk. 
High deductible plans and health 
savings accounts have similar effects. 
Individuals essentially self-finance the 
cost of care below the deductibles 
in plans. Individuals with health 
problems are more likely to incur 
health care costs that require paying 
these deductibles. Thus, there is 
more self-financing of care by the 
sick than under plans that have more 
comprehensive coverage. That is, 
those who have health conditions and 
face higher deductibles are asked to 
perform the rationing function that 
comes with facing higher prices.
Another issue with these tax proposals 
relates to the adequacy of subsidies. 
The criticism of the public contracting 
model (in the view of some, the basic 
criticism of socialized medicine) is 
that rationing and poor quality of care 
result. But if subsidies are inadequate 
to purchase decent coverage in the 
private market, or if purchase of 
coverage in the private market is 
difficult because of the presence of 
health conditions, then the inability 
to pay will lead to plans with more 
limited benefits, more limited access, 
and in the end poor quality of care. The 
job of rationing shifts from government 
to private plans. Put differently, 
problems of access and quality are not 
inherent in government contracting 
and can just as easily occur with 
more market-oriented approaches if 
they involve inadequate low-income 
subsidies and minimal pooling of risk. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that 
there are four basic models for health 
coverage, which include considerable 
variation. At one extreme is the 
public integrated model, where the 
government finances, manages, and 
controls both the demand and supply 
side of the market. The other extreme 
envisions private insurance, loosely 
regulated, combined with tax subsidies 
helping lower-income people purchase 
coverage in the individual market. The 
debate in this country is generally not 
about the former and only in some 
circles about the latter. Most proposals 
involve a mixture of public- and private-
sector responsibilities. The government 
would expand its role in both financing 
and, under some proposals, contracting 
with private insurers and/or private 
providers for care, but clearly would not 
“run” the health care system under most 
reform proposals. 
No serious reform proposal of which 
we are aware would result in either 
a purely government-run system or a 
pure free market, with unregulated and 
unsubsidized health care.  All serious 
proposals are on a continuum between 
these extremes. The real challenge 
facing policy-makers is finding the 
right spot in the continuum—the 
combination of public- and private- 
sector roles and responsibilities 
that yields the best outcome for the 
American people. 
It is a significant exaggeration to 
claim that proposals like SCHIP 
reauthorization and plans advanced by 
the leading Democratic presidential 
candidates, current and former, 
represent steps toward socialized 
medicine. None of these approaches 
would change the country’s heavy 
reliance on private health care 
providers. In fact, both SCHIP and the 
most widely endorsed reforms among 
Democratic presidential contenders 
would preserve, if not expand, the 
central role of private insurance and 
private providers while increasing 
consumers’ freedom of choice and 
access to care. 
By contrast, single-payer plans can 
involve such a major expansion of the 
government’s role that they would 
become the functional equivalent of 
socialized medicine. However, federal 
policy-makers are unlikely to consider 
seriously such proposals, unlike the 
plans advanced by more prominent 
Democratic presidential aspirants and 
the SCHIP reauthorization legislation 
approved in Congress by wide 
bipartisan margins. 
More market-oriented proposals 
by President Bush and current and 
former Republican candidates for 
president would use tax subsidies 
to give more Americans access to 
individual coverage. Depending 
on their details, these proposals 
may undermine access and quality, 
effectively imposing a form of 
rationing, particularly for people 
with limited income or significant 
health care needs. In addition, they 
would do little to change the current 
reliance on Medicaid and Medicare 
for the care of the poor, disabled, and 
elderly. And they would still use the 
power of government to redistribute 
a considerable amount of income and 
achieve other policy goals. 
The core issue in health reform is not 
specifically the role of government, but 
what policies yield the best possible 
consequences for the American public. 
Such results include the number 
of people with health coverage, 
consumers’ quality of and access to 
necessary care, health care cost growth, 
and consumers’ ability to make choices 
about their health care and health 
coverage. Rhetoric about socialized 
medicine and government-run health 
care is a distraction from these much 
more fundamental concerns.
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